Country Report: Georgia

​Georgia took significant steps backward on human rights in 2024, with several new repressive laws undermining freedom of expression and of association. In November, the ruling party suspended efforts to open EU accession negotiations until late 2028, prompting mass, countrywide protests. 
 
In June, Georgia’s parliament adopted a law obliging certain nongovernmental groups and media outlets to register as “organizations serving the interests of a foreign power.” The ruling party claimed the law aims to promote transparency but other official rhetoric, the timing of its introduction, and its substantive provisions suggest it aims to discredit and marginalize independent groups and media. In September, under the guise of “protecting family values and children,” the authorities adopted a discriminatory anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) law imposing restrictions on rights to education, health, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly. 
 
In October, the ruling party claimed decisive victory in a highly disputed parliamentary election, which opposition parties, President Salome Zurabishvili, and independent observer groups claimed was marred by intimidation, vote-buying, and fraud. 
 
Police repeatedly used excessive force against largely peaceful demonstrators protesting the government’s decision to abort the EU accession negotiations. They groundlessly fired tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets at protesters. 
Police beat, chased down, and detained largely peaceful protesters. Violent mobs, presumably associated with authorities, participated in beatings. Several hundred protesters were arrested on misdemeanor and criminal charges. Many reported beatings and ill-treatment in detention; dozens required hospitalization. 
 
Parliamentary Election 
The Georgian Dream party retained power with nearly 54 percent of the vote, while the united opposition garnered 38 percent. President Zurabishvli and opposition parties rejected the results amid widespread reports of ballot stuffing, vote buying, and intimidation. International observers found that the polls offered a “wide choice” of candidates, but flagged concerns about the impact of recently adopted laws “on fundamental freedoms and civil society,” widespread reports of pressure on public sector employees and other voters, and compromised vote secrecy in 24 percent of polling stations they visited. Georgian groups alleged that the ruling party resorted to a complex rigging scheme. 
 
For the first time, parliament was fully elected through proportional party votes, rather than a mix of individual and party-based mandates, with voters using electronically scanned paper ballots in most precincts. Georgian Young Lawyers Association, a local watchdog group, filed complaints to annul the results in all precincts that used scanned ballots, claiming breach of vote secrecy because the selections were visible on ballot papers as voters fed them into scanners. Higher courts rejected all election-related complaints. 
 
Georgia’s international partners called for impartial investigations into alleged violations. Freedom of Expression and Assembly 
 
In June, parliament adopted a law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” put forward by the Georgia Dream party. A type of “foreign agent” law, it requires nongovernmental groups and media receiving 20 percent or more of their funding from abroad to register as “organizations serving the interests of a foreign power.” It imposes onerous, intrusive, and duplicative reporting requirements, and allows the authorities to demand sensitive personal data from organizations and individuals. Non-compliance is punishable by maximum fines of 25,000 GEL (US$9,300). 
 
In May, the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, concluded that the rights restrictions that the law imposes fail to meet the “requirements of legality, legitimacy, and necessity in a democratic society” and violate the principles of proportionality and nondiscrimination. 
 
Experts with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) urged the authorities to scrap the law, as did Georgia’s bilateral and multilateral partners. 
 
Many NGOs and media refused to voluntarily register. Together with Georgia’s president and opposition MPs, they challenged the law in the Constitutional Court, requesting its suspension pending the court’s final decision. The court accepted the complaint on the merits. 
 
In June, the United States imposed visa restrictions on dozens of Georgian nationals for their role in “undermining democracy in Georgia.” The 27 EU heads of state and government stated that the law’s adoption in effect halted Georgia’s EU accession process. 
 
Violence against Activists 
In the weeks before the “foreign agent” law’s final adoption, civic and political activists became targets of an apparently coordinated campaign of harassment and intimidation. Hundreds of activists and their family members, including children, received repeated, anonymous threatening phone calls. Smear campaigns of posters in several cities featured the images of nongovernmental group leaders and critical journalists, calling them traitors and enemies. 
 
From late April through June, unidentified assailants violently attacked over a dozen activists, leading, in many cases, to head and other injuries requiring hospitalization. Most attacks were committed by small groups of assailants in public places with witnesses and CCTV cameras nearby. While the police opened investigations, they have not identified or arrested any suspects at time of writing, raising concerns about the investigations. 
 
In her September statement, the UN special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders observed that some attacks might have been incited by senior government officials’ statements. The EU called on “Georgian political actors to refrain from using language [that] could further fuel ... extreme polarization.” 
 
Law Enforcement Abuses and Impunity 
Tens of thousands of people protested the “foreign agents” bill continuously following its introduction in April. On multiple occasions, during especially large demonstrations in front of the parliament building, police used tear gas, water cannons, and pepper spray to disperse mainly nonviolent protesters. There were credible reports of police using rubber bullets at least once on May 1. Police arrested hundreds on misdemeanor charges, and courts imposed fines on many after perfunctory trials. Over a dozen journalists and media representatives sustained injuries because of police use of force during the protests. 
 
The Public Defender’s Office (PDO) visited 182 detainees following the protests, 93 of whom reported police misconduct. The PDO referred 73 of these cases to the Special Investigation Service (SIS), a body responsible for investigating law enforcement abuses. 
 
From January to September 2024, the SIS opened investigations into 147 cases of alleged ill-treatment by law enforcement, and 11 investigations into alleged interference with journalistic work. The prosecutor’s office initiated three criminal investigations against law enforcement officers for alleged ill-treatment. 
 
In September, the US imposed sanctions on two Interior Ministry officials for their involvement in “the violent response to peaceful protests,” and imposed visa restrictions on dozens of other individuals playing a “critical role in advancing undemocratic legislation and restricting civil society.” 
 
Also in September, the European Court of Human Rights found that Georgian authorities violated the prohibition on torture and the right to liberty by failing to effectively investigate Azerbaijani journalist Afgan Mukhtarli’s alleged abduction, mistreatment, and illegal transfer to Azerbaijan in 2017. 
 
Gender and Sexuality 
In September, parliament adopted anti-LGBT amendments imposing discriminatory restrictions on rights to education, health, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly. The amendments ban gender-affirming medical care for trans people, same-sex marriage, and adoption by same-sex couples. They also prohibit positive references to LGBT people in literature, film, and media, as well as in schools and at public gatherings. 
 
In June, the Venice Commission urged the authorities not to adopt the amendments, warning that their mere introduction could deepen the already hostile and stigmatizing atmosphere against LGBT individuals in Georgia. 
 
In 2024, the organizers of Tbilisi Pride refrained from holding in-person events during Pride Month, citing concerns over potential violence and hate rhetoric, compounded by introduction of the anti-LGBT legislation. 
 
In April, the parliament abolished mandatory parliamentary and municipal council quotas for women. The quotas required that at least one in every four individuals on a political party list be of a different gender than the majority. The Venice Commission and OSCE criticized the move, calling on the authorities to increase women’s political representation. 
 
Women’s political representation in Georgia remains well under the recommended European standard of 40 percent. Only 3 of Georgia’s 64 municipalities have female mayors, and women comprised less than 19 percent of MPs elected in 2020. 
 
Children’s Rights 
In its concluding observations on Georgia, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child highlighted the need for urgent measures in several key areas, including abuse, neglect, sexual violence, and exploitation of children. The committee expressed concern over insufficient measures to address violence in families, residential care, foster care, and educational institutions. 
 
In June, the committee issued a decision on a complaint filed on behalf of 57 children residing in an orphanage run by the Georgian Orthodox Church. It found that the government failed to take necessary action to investigate and address the frequent physical and psychological abuse of children living there. 
 
Labor rights 
Labor rights continue to be a serious concern in Georgia. Overtime regulations are weak, wage theft is widespread, social protections are minimal, and wages are effectively unregulated. The national minimum wage of 20 GEL per month (US$7) has not been updated since 1999 and is almost 93 times lower than the estimated living wage of 1,858 GEL. 
 
According to the Labor Inspectorate, 34 workers died and 347 were injured in work-related accidents during 2023. The rate of workplace injuries per 100,000 workers increased every year since 2020, though workplace deaths have declined over the same period. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025. New York

Regional: Asia and Pacific (Part 1)

​Asia and the Pacific is home to 56 per cent of the world’s population, including the two most populous countries, India and China, and experienced the greatest increase in international migrants from 2000 to 2020. The region hosts the largest number of people in modern slavery, with an estimated 15 million people in forced labour. This includes debt bondage among migrants exploited within the region, hereditary forms of bonded labour in South Asia, and state-imposed forced labour in China, North Korea, and other countries. The prevalence of forced marriage in Asia and the
Pacific is second highest in the world, after the Arab States, impacting an estimated 4.5 females and 2.1 males per every thousand people.

Although the region is highly diverse in terms of geography, ethnicity, culture, religion, and wealth, modern slavery occurs in every country. Discrimination on the basis of gender, race, caste, ethnicity drives vulnerability to modern slavery. This vulnerability is compounded by conflict, as seen with the mass displacement of the Rohingya population in Myanmar, political instability, as shown by the seizure of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and economic insecurity, as illustrated by the economic crisis and humanitarian emergency in Sri Lanka. To varying extents, the effects of climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated vulnerability across the region — driving increased unemployment, poverty, and gender inequality. 

Australia took the most action to combat modern slavery in the region, followed by the Philippines and Thailand, while North Korea and Iran took the least. Across most countries, governments should address significant gaps including raising the age of marriage to 18 for girls and boys with no exemptions and ensuring that labour rights are extended to all workers, including migrants.

What is the extent and nature of modern slavery in the region?
On any given day in 2021, an estimated 29.3 million people were living in modern slavery in Asia and the Pacific. This accounts for 59 per cent of the global total. When population size is taken into account, Asia and the Pacific had the third highest prevalence of modern slavery in the world with 6.8 per thousand people in the region forced to work or marry. Among the five regions, Asia and the Pacific had the second highest prevalence of forced marriage (3.3 per thousand) and the third highest prevalence of forced labour (3.5 per thousand).
 
The country with by far the highest prevalence in Asia and the Pacific, and, indeed, the world, is North Korea, where the population is forced to work by the state or risk being penalised with hard labour in prison camps. In North Korea, an estimated one in every 10 people are in situations of modern slavery.

Following North Korea, Afghanistan, and Myanmar had the second and third highest prevalence of modern slavery in the region. India, China, and North Korea had the highest number — and together accounting for two- thirds of all people in modern slavery in the region. Instability continues to shape experiences of modern slavery across high prevalence countries in Asia and the Pacific. For example, the worsening humanitarian situation caused by the political and economic turmoil drives modern slavery practices in Afghanistan and Myanmar. In these contexts, families may resort to negative coping mechanisms, such as marrying their young daughters, to deal with economic stress. In other countries with a high prevalence of modern slavery, such as Pakistan and India, economic insecurity drives workers to take on risky jobs or loans from unscrupulous employers. Employers then exploit these workers by forcing them into labour-intensive jobs to repay their debts.

​Although these regional figures of modern slavery are the most reliable to date, they are conservative estimates given the gaps and limitations of data in key regions and subregions. For example, difficulties in conducting surveys in 
countries that are experiencing conflict means that our estimates for these countries likely understate the problem, despite our efforts to address data gaps. These estimates also do not include the recruitment of child soldiers or organ trafficking, which other sources note occur in parts of the region. The true number of people living in situations of modern slavery in Asia and the Pacific is likely much higher.

What drives vulnerability to modern slavery in the region? 
Asia and the Pacific is the third most vulnerable region in the world to modern slavery. The drivers most influencing this risk include widespread discriminatory social norms, political inequality and instability, and economic insecurity. While conflict- induced displacement and disruption widened gaps in wealth and social capital in some countries, vulnerability was compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and climate-related disasters. Overall, Afghanistan had the highest levels of vulnerability (86 per cent) and Australia the lowest (7 per cent). 
 
Discriminatory social norms that devalue marginalised groups on the basis of their migration status, race, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation are the greatest driver of vulnerability in the region. In Myanmar, the Rohingya minority continue to face mass displacement, abductions, sexual violence, and murder, driving many to seek protection in Bangladesh. Once in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees face increased risks of modern slavery as offenders prey on their extreme vulnerability, while families living in camps struggle to cope with food and economic insecurity, which, coupled with gender discrimination, has led to increased rates of child marriage. The persecution of religious and ethnic minorities occurs in China, including the use of state-imposed forced labour to control the Uyghur population and other Turkic and Muslim majority groups in the Uyghur region. The extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghur and other predominately Muslim groups has been called a crime against humanity by the UN Human Rights Commissioner.
 
Political inequality and instability pervade many countries in the region, driving vulnerability to modern slavery. Notably, Afghanistan is considered the least peaceful country in the world. In August 2021, after four decades of war, the Taliban seized control, triggering political, economic, and social shocks and worsening the humanitarian situation. The crisis has caused many civilians to turn to smugglers to flee the country, often to countries with measures in place to actively deter Afghan refugees, which compounds their vulnerability to exploitation. Afghan women and girls have reportedly been forced into marriages by their families to escape the country. In Iran, physical and sexual violence is perpetrated by security forces as a means to repress women’s rights and stifle political dissent, which has attracted coordinated sanctions from 30 countries in March 2023.Hundreds of activists have been unfairly imprisoned and subject to torture and sexual assault or killed since protests erupted in September 2022, following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini — who was arrested for wearing her hijab incorrectly. Personal status laws that deny women equal rights in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and children further entrench gender inequality and vulnerability to exploitation.
 
Economic instability and increasing poverty limit access to essential needs for survival such as shelter, food, and water, and increase vulnerability to all forms of modern slavery in Asia and the Pacific. This is underpinned by widening wealth gaps: in 2021, an additional 80 million people were forced into poverty due to pandemic-related disruptions in economic activity. This risk is compounded for disenfranchised groups who were already living in precarious conditions. In India, for example, a sudden lockdown in early 2020 left many migrant workers, who were largely employed as day labourers, stranded and without support from the government or their employers. Many had no alternative but to make the journey home on foot, often walking hundreds of kilometres, while others took out loans to meet their basic needs. After a devastating second wave of COVID-19 buckled the Indian health system in 2021 and caused many deaths from the disease,thousands of newly orphaned children were exposed to higher risks of abuse and trafficking.
 
Climate change and climate-related disasters exacerbate risks to modern slavery by reducing access to essential needs and increasing existing disparities in wealth and social capital levels. These burdens were not evenly shared across the region. Many people in low-lying countries in the Pacific Islands expect to be displaced from their homes due to the effects of climate change, if they have not been already. Intensifying weather events and rising sea levels contribute to food and water insecurity through crop loss, loss of arable land, overcrowding, poor health and sanitation, and increased competition for limited jobs. These conditions create opportunities for traffickers to exploit vulnerable individuals, particularly where avenues for regular migration are not readily available. Risk of modern slavery also increases through reliance on negative coping mechanisms. For instance, in Bangladesh, one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change, extreme weather has been linked to child marriage to both minimise household expenses and protect daughters from the heightened risk of sexual violence.
 
Walk Free 2023. Global Slavery Index 2023. Minderoo Foundation Ltd. Australia.

Country Report: Ethiopia

​The human rights situation in Ethiopia remained dire, with government forces, militias, and non-state armed groups committing serious abuses in conflict-affected areas and elsewhere throughout the country. 
 
Fighting between the Ethiopian military and militias in the Amhara region resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries, including attacks against refugees and civilian infrastructure such as hospitals. The government renewed a sweeping state of emergency for the Amhara region, but its provisions were applied throughout Ethiopia; mass arrests persisted once it expired. 
 
Authorities harassed, surveilled, and detained journalists, human rights defenders, and outspoken figures, creating an increasingly hostile and restrictive reporting environment. 
 
Impunity for human rights abuses remained the norm. While the government developed a transitional justice policy, accountability efforts for past and ongoing abuses have been inadequate and lacked transparency and independent oversight. Ethiopia’s international partners continued to normalize their relationships with the Ethiopian government with little regard for ongoing abuses. 
 
Consensual same-sex relationships are outlawed and carry a penalty of up to 15 years in prison. 
 
Ethiopia grappled with soaring inflation and rising external debt. In January, the United Arab Emirates pledged US$2.4 billion investment, and in July agreed to a bilateral currency swap. That same month, the World Bank approved US$1.5 billion in direct budget support, while the government secured a US$3.4 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund as part of an economic reform program. Authorities announced policies aimed at gradually eliminating fuel subsidies, while lawmakers considered a proposal to expand the value-added tax law to include transportation services, water, and electricity. 
 
Ethiopia’s relationship with Somalia and Eritrea grew increasingly strained after the government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, which Somalia considers part of its territory. 
 
Conflict and Abuses 
The armed conflict between the Ethiopian military and Fano militia in the Amhara region continued throughout 2024, with warring parties committing war crimes and other serious abuses. 
 
In Amhara, government forces carried out extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, torture, and ill-treatment against civilians, and used drones and heavy artillery against civilians, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Fano militias were also responsible for killings of civilians, attacks on civilian objects, and unlawful arrests. 
 
On January 29, Ethiopian military forces summarily killed dozens of civilians and carried out other war crimes in Merawi town, marking one of the deadliest incidents since the outbreak of the conflict in August 2023. On February 24, military forces again killed civilians in Merawi following another Fano attack in the town. 
 
Media reported a February 19 apparent drone strike on a truck transporting civilians in Amhara, which killed at least 30 people and left more wounded. Government strikes in Amhara reportedly continued in October. 
 
Ethiopian forces also committed widespread attacks amounting to war crimes against medical professionals, patients, and health facilities in the Amhara region. Soldiers beat, arbitrarily arrested, and intimidated medical professionals. Soldiers also unlawfully attacked medical transports and interfered with the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 
 
International humanitarian presence remained deeply constrained in Amhara, where the UN faced the highest incidents of violence in the country. Since January, eight aid workers have been killed. In October, media reported that the UN was considering suspending relief operations in Amhara due to attacks on aid workers. 
 
In Tigray, Eritrean government forces committed rape and sexual violence against women and girls, and abducted, and pillaged civilian property in areas they occupied. 
 
Communities across the country experienced a sharp rise in kidnappings for ransom, with authorities failing to address the crisis. In July, kidnappers in Oromia reportedly abducted more than 100 people, mostly university students travelling from the Amhara region. 
 
Freedoms of Expression, Media, and Association 
On February 2, Ethiopia’s parliament extended the state of emergency in the Amhara region, initially enacted in August 2023, by an additional four months. 
 
Under the law, authorities carried out mass arrests without a warrant and enabled numerous restrictions on people’s movement and communication. Authorities targeted journalists and politicians critical of the government’s actions in Amhara. On January 31, Ethiopian security forces arrested Dessalegn Chanie, a member of parliament representing the opposition party, the National Movement of the Amhara (NAMA). Authorities released Dessalegn on March 14. The state of emergency expired in June. 
 
In late September, security forces carried out a new wave of mass arbitrary arrests in Amhara, where hundreds of people, including senior police and national intelligence members, as well as journalists, academics, lawyers, and civil servants were detained according to Amnesty International. On February 22, security officers detained Batte Urgessa, a member of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an opposition party, and French journalist Antoine Galindo, as they met in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. Following an international outcry,
 
Antoine Galindo was released on February 29, while Batte remained detained until March 6. On April 10, Batte was murdered in his hometown in the Oromia region. In the ensuing days, local police announced the arrest of 13 suspects to the killing, including Batte’s younger brother, Millo. Authorities detained Millo for eight months, despite court orders calling for his release. 
 
Ethiopian security and intelligence forces intimidated, harassed, and threatened prominent Ethiopian human rights organizations, forcing several rights defenders into exile. On May 23, security officials visited the Addis Ababa offices of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), in search of information, and threatened two staff members in the process. On April 6, 2024, two security force personnel came to the home of an EHRCO staff member and warned them to cease their human rights work or face consequences. 
 
In mid-November, the Ethiopian Authority for Civil Society Organizations (ACSO), a government body that oversees civil society groups, suspended the Center for the Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), the Association for Human Rights in Ethiopia (AHRE), and Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR), forcing the organizations to cease their work. Ethiopian authorities lifted the suspension on December 11. 
 
Media remained under a government stranglehold, with many journalists having to choose between self-censorship, harassment and arrest, or exile. In June, the Committee to Protect Journalists reported that 54 journalists and media workers had fled the country since 2020. 
 
Authorities resumed mobile-internet services in several cities in Amhara in July after year- long disruptions of communications. After hostilities escalated in September, authorities once again cut mobile internet services, hampering communications and real-time reporting. 
 
Due Process and Fair Trial Rights 
Authorities detained critics and journalists for prolonged periods without charge. In June, authorities released journalists Belay Manaye, Bekalu Alamirew, and Tewodros Zerfu, and opposition figure Sintayehu Chekol after several months in detention. Authorities had held Belay and Bekalu in different detention sites, including Awash Arba military camp, under harsh detention conditions. 
 
Amhara journalists and opposition politicians, including Christian Tadele and Yohannes Buayalew, among others, whom authorities detained as part of a broader crackdown in August 2023, remained in detention. 
 
On September 5, the government released seven senior Oromo political opposition figures, whom authorities arbitrarily detained for four years without charge and ignored multiple court orders calling for their release. 
 
In April, media reported that authorities demolished homes and evicted thousands of residents in the capital with little warning and at times with no compensation.
 
Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees 
In February, Ethiopian authorities facilitated the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Amhara to their areas of origin in Oromia in a manner that aid agencies found did not align with international IDP return principles. 
 
In Tigray, the UN reported tens of thousands of people displaced to the neighbouring Amhara region, following armed clashes in Alamata town in mid-April. 
 
Conflict and unrest in Amhara also impacted refugees. Local militias and gunmen subjected Sudanese refugees in Awlala and Kumer camps to killings, beatings, looting, and forced labour. On August 21, Ethiopian soldiers, police, and local militia beat and separated Sudanese refugees, returning several hundred to Sudan in a process that did not meet international standards. Between September 1 and 8, Ethiopian federal forces clashed with Fano, an Amhara armed group, in and around these camps, putting refugees at risk. 
 
Barriers to Education 
In November 2023, the Ministry of Education published a draft directive requiring students to return to school within 15 days of giving birth or be suspended for the academic year. Women’s rights organizations criticized the directive for undermining girls’ rights to education and adequate maternity leave. 
 
In April, the UN said continued hostilities in Amhara and the impact of the conflict in northern Ethiopia forced the closure of 4,178 schools in Amhara. The region’s education bureau reported that enrollment dropped to two million out of a target of seven million. Warring parties in Amhara and in Tigray also occupied and used schools for military purposes. 
 
Accountability and Justice 
In April, the government approved a nation-wide transitional justice policy, after a year- long consultation process that was criticized by victims, political opposition groups, and civil society actors over the lack of transparency and the inclusiveness of the consultations, and the timeliness of the discussion while fighting was ongoing. 
 
Ethiopian authorities continued to deny or downplay allegations that it committed abuses against civilians, casting doubt on its commitment to hold its forces and Eritrean soldiers to account for grave crimes. 
 
At the March and September Human Rights Council sessions, the European Union delivered joint statements, supported by more than 40 UN members, which affirmed the importance of a credible transitional justice and accountability process with the March statement saying it should include an international component. In September, the United States extended its executive order that established a sanctions regime for human rights abuses and other actions in northern Ethiopia. 
 
In March, Ethiopian authorities dropped all charges “for the sake of public interest,” and released Abdi Mohamoud Omar, also known as Abdi Illey, the former president of Ethiopia’s Somali region after he served more than five years in prison. Authorities never brought charges against him for decades of abusive rule. 
 
In June, a UN inter-agency report evaluating the aid response to the conflict in northern Ethiopia found systemic failures by UN agencies to overcome government restrictions, abide by humanitarian principles, meet essential needs and protect communities, including from sexual violence in its response. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025. New York

Regional: Arab States (Part 5)

​Impact of COVID-19 
The situation worsened for many migrants during the COVID-19 pandemic, with reports of wage theft in the construction, hospitality, and manufacturing sectors in Gulf countries, largely driven by order cancellations, weakened labour protections (allowing employers to reduce wages), and dismissal or repatriation of workers without pay. Migrants from countries in Asia and Africa are often recruited to work in these sectors by a complex network of local brokers, recruitment agents, friends, and relatives. They may receive limited or inaccurate information about the nature of the work and be required to pay substantial recruitment fees to migrate through informal and formal channels, thereby increasing their risk of debt-bondage and exploitation in the destination. During the pandemic, some migrants reportedly defaulted on loan repayments due to wage theft and were subsequently arrested in the UAE, while several migrant workers in Qatar were deported before receiving their wages. Construction workers were physically abused after requesting their unpaid salaries in Saudi Arabia, where the government also allowed a temporary 40 per cent pay reduction in the private sector. Lockdowns intensified social isolation and vulnerability among domestic workers in private households and compounded difficulties in sending remittances home. Some domestic workers in Lebanon were abandoned outside their consulates by employers who said they can no longer afford to pay them.
 
Forms of tied visa programs operate in several other countries globally, and these systems similarly increase migrant workers’ vulnerability to exploitation. However, the various iterations of the kafala system involve some of the most restrictive conditions and are present in countries which have among the highest concentrations of migrant workers in the world. Over the past decade, countries that uphold kafala have faced significant criticism due to the pervasive abuse of migrant workers under the system, with major international events such as the Qatar 2022 FIFA World Cup and Dubai World Expo 2020 drawing global attention to the issue. Several countries have instituted reforms, some in response to mounting international pressure, yet no country has abolished kafala entirely, with vestiges of the system undermining reform efforts. 
 
Qatar represents one example in which preparations for the FIFA World Cup since 2010 have drawn attention to grave migrant worker abuses in the construction, hotel, and security sectors. Amid mounting criticism in 2017, Qatar agreed to undertake a technical cooperation program with the ILO, seeking to align laws and practices with international labour standards. Promisingly, in 2020 Qatar ceased requiring exit permits for workers excluded from the scope of the labour law, including migrant domestic workers, expanding upon a similar 2018 amendment.Qatar also removed No- Objection Certificate (NOC) requirements, allowing workers to change jobs without permission from their employer under certain conditions. However, these positive reforms have been undermined by gaps in implementation and protections. In practice, the system is not only difficult for migrant workers to navigate, but many are unaware of their right to leave, and even if they are they still face the threat of retaliation from their employers who may file false allegations of theft or absconding. As reports of abuse persisted in the lead-up to the World Cup, human rights organisations continued to call for the government to enforce reforms and for FIFA and the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy (the body responsible for delivering the event) to strengthen due diligence and monitoring, as well as establish a scheme to remediate harms caused. While global attention was brought to the issue following the games, it has not been followed by any meaningful commitment or action by FIFA and the Qatari government, with impacted migrant workers still struggling to access compensation.
 
Several other countries have implemented limited reforms to increase job mobility in recent years. In 2021, the government of Oman removed its NOC requirement, allowing workers to transfer jobs without their employer’s permission upon completion of their contract. Saudi Arabia’s 2021 Labour Reform Initiative similarly allows workers to change jobs or leave the country without employer consent;however, workers must complete one year of their contract and migrant domestic workers, among others, are excluded from this protection. Under 2016 reforms allowing workers to transfer jobs in the UAE, workers must complete their contract or provide advance notice to avoid an employment ban, and may be required to compensate their employer. As in Qatar, absconding is punishable in each of these countries and places migrant workers at risk of arrest or deportation for leaving abusive workplaces. 
 
Even in Bahrain, which previously had the most sweeping reforms to the kafala system, gaps in protections persisted.69 In 2017, the government introduced the Flexi-Permit, allowing migrant workers to freely change jobs and leave the country without facing possible charges of absconding. This granted greater freedom than had ever been seen under the kafala system, yet the steep price of the permit deterred those eligible from self- sponsoring and permit-holders lacked defined labour protections under the law. Rather than address these shortcomings in line with civil society recommendations, Bahrain abandoned the system entirely in October 2022, replacing it with a program that allows workers to self-sponsor within designated professions. Under the new system, workers must obtain a vocational work permit through a certified registration centre, effectively privatising the process. While the reforms purport to strengthen protections for migrants, those with irregular status from October 2022 are not eligible for the permit (unlike the Flexi-Permit system). Further, workers must still bear the cost of the permit and can no longer obtain commercial registration. The reforms were passed amid pressure from the business community, which was driven by fears that freelance migrant workers posed a threat to local businesses, and due to a government push to nationalise their workforce in a bid to move away from reliance on migrant workers.
 
Several countries in the region still grapple with strong opposition to comprehensive reforms due to perceived economic benefits of the kafala system and entrenched discriminatory attitudes towards foreign workers. In 2020, prior to the installation of a new government in Lebanon, a new standard unified contract was proposed to allow migrant workers to change employers after one month’s notice, among other protections. However, the contract was swiftly struck down by the Shura Council, Lebanon’s highest administrative court, after the Syndicate of Owners of Recruitment Agencies in Lebanon claimed that the contract violated the labour law and would adversely affect domestic worker recruitment, a lucrative trade in Lebanon.

The government of Jordan has taken the least action to reform the kafala system. Jordan currently maintains all elements of the kafala system, whereby migrant workers typically cannot enter or exit the country or transfer jobs without written employer consent. While the government has made some attempts to curb illegal practices of unscrupulous recruitment agents and improve protections, there is a lack of capacity and will to enforce the regulations. 
 
Walk Free 2023. Global Slavery Index 2023. Minderoo Foundation Ltd. Australia.