Country Report: Malaysia

​Despite some reforms, Malaysia continues to wield repressive laws to criminalize dissent, censor critical speech, and harass human rights defenders. Refugees and migrants face indefinite detention in overcrowded, unhygienic conditions. 
 
In 2025, Malaysia assumed the rotating chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
 
Freedom of Expression, Assembly, and Religion 
On February 12, police arrested Sevan Dorsaisamy, executive director of the human rights organization SUARAM, for allegedly trespassing in a peaceful attempt to engage the Home Ministry regarding detention conditions at Sungai Buloh prison. 
 
In February, the government announced plans to amend the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 (PAA) and a moratorium on ongoing investigations. On July 1, Malaysia’s highest court unanimously ruled unconstitutional section 9(5) of the act, which penalizes organizers if they fail to notify police at least five days before a peaceful assembly. On July 22, civil society groups and human rights defenders were prevented from protesting on Parliament grounds by police and riot control forces. 
 
In December 2024, the Malaysian parliament approved amendments to the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 that give officials expanded authority to censor online content. In August, the Appeal Court ruled unconstitutional the words “offensive” and “annoy” in section 233, which has been regularly used to criminalize dissent. 
 
Malaysia’s government widely censors books, including titles discussing gender and sexuality, under section 7(1) of the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984. 
 
New laws in Terengganu state threaten prison terms of up to two years for Muslim men who miss Friday prayers without a valid reason. 
 
Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Migrants 
Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and lacks domestic asylum procedures. About 210,000 refugees and asylum seekers—including over 124,000 ethnic Rohingya Muslims and some 64,800 children—are registered with the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) but not granted legal status, unable to formally work or enroll in government schools. 
 
In 2025, Malaysian authorities significantly escalated immigration raids. Between January and May, authorities arrested an estimated 34,000 individuals. 
 
The Malaysian government was detaining about 18,000 migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in immigration detention centers without judicial oversight, as of July 2025. Detainees are at risk of indefinite detention. Since 2019, the government has denied UNHCR access to immigration detention centers and Baitul Mahabbah centers, dedicated facilities for children ages 10 and younger. The home minister told parliament 10 percent of detainees were children as of July 2025.
 
Criminal Justice System 
Malaysia abolished the mandatory death penalty in 2023. Re-sentencing processes have significantly reduced the number of people on death row. As of January 2025, the total was 140, down from 1,300 in November 2023. 
 
Malaysia retains the death sentence for drug trafficking under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. Forty people remain on death row for drug-related offenses. Corporal punishment, which amounts to torture under international law, remains a mandatory alternative punishment to the death penalty for some offenses. 
 
Malaysia detains individuals without trial under restrictive laws, such as the Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act 2012 (SOSMA). Following civil society pressure, the Home Ministry was finalizing its review of SOSMA at time of writing, with proposed amendments to be debated in parliament. 
 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
State-sponsored discrimination against LGBT people remains pervasive, including government funding of “conversion” practices. Malaysian law as well as state and federal territory Sharia (Islamic law) criminalize same-sex activity and gender nonconformity. 
 
In June, Malaysian authorities in Kelantan State raided an alleged “gay party,” arrested 20 men, and charged three with “possession of homosexual pornographic material.” The Malaysian AIDS Council and the Health Ministry confirmed the event was a health outreach program providing HIV-related information. The Kelantan police chief confirmed authorities found no evidence of sexual activity. 
 
In November, local authorities raided a gym and sauna in Kuala Lumpur suspected of “operating as a front for organizing same-sex activities.” 202 people were arrested in the raid; 171 Malaysian men were released after 24 hours, while 31 foreigners were remanded for immigration processing. 
 
In May, organizers were forced to postpone a workshop titled “Pride Care: Queer Stories and Sexual Health Awareness” following public condemnation from the religious affairs minister, a police investigation, and online harassment. 
 
Women’s Rights 
In June, the Federal Court partially overturned a 2014 fatwa against Sisters in Islam (SIS), a women’s rights organization. 
 
Malaysia launched its first National Women’s Policy and Women’s Development Plan in March 2025, which addresses access to education, health care, and economic and political participation. 
 
Advocates continue to highlight flaws in Malaysia’s Persons with Disabilities Act 2008. The Malaysia Bar has called for an amendment to the Federal Constitution explicitly prohibiting disability-based discrimination. 
 
Environment and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
In February, the Sarawak State government announced it would no longer grant provisional leases to palm oil companies, nearly seven years after the federal government capped the expansion of oil palm plantations nationwide. 
 
In August, Malaysia launched its first National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights (NAPBHR), which commits the government to new legislation including a climate change bill and a freedom of information act enabling access to environmental impact assessments. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026. New York.

Country Report: Malawi

​In September 2025, Malawi voted in a general election. The lead-up to the election was marked by democratic backsliding, undermining reforms which took place after the Constitutional Court annulled the country’s 2019 elections. The 2025 election was characterized by unequal campaign conditions for the political opposition. Civil society and political opposition parties also raised concerns about the impartiality of the electoral commission. Reports of politically motivated violence increased before the election, and the authorities’ failure to investigate them risked normalizing impunity. 
 
In July, the Constitutional Court found Malawi’s criminal defamation
laws disproportionately restricted freedom of expression and were incompatible with Malawi’s commitments under regional and international human rights law. The court struck down section 200 of the Penal Code, which had criminalized defamation. 
 
Civil and Political Rights 
Malawians went to the polls on September 16 to vote for the president and members of parliament. Despite commending the peaceful elections, observer missions urged Malawi to undertake electoral reforms, including establishing continuous voter registration and a permanent electoral roll, enabling diaspora participation, clarifying the legal framework for electronic systems, and addressing electoral-related criminal acts. 
 
Before the election, reports of politically motivated violence surged. On June 26, 2025, the police stood by as weapon-wielding men attacked demonstrators calling for an independent audit of the voters’ roll and the resignation of top electoral commission officials. Civil society groups and opposition parties alleged that those behind the political violence had links to the ruling Malawi Congress Party, though the party denied such claims. 
 
The police’s apparent unwillingness to intervene to stop the violence – or to arrest those responsible, even when their identities were known – raised grave concerns about the government’s willingness to hold the perpetrators accountable. The authorities’ muted response to attacks on peaceful assembly risks normalizing impunity that could undermine the country’s democratic gains. 
 
Freedom of Expression 
In an important step towards protecting free speech, Malawi’s Constitutional Court decriminalized defamation in July. Social media activist Joshua Chisa Mbele had challenged the constitutionality of the penal code’s Section 200. He argued it infringed his right to freedom of expression and was inconsistent with Malawi’s obligations under regional and international human rights law. Mbele lodged the constitutional challenge while facing criminal proceedings for alleged defamatory statements concerning a top public official. 
 
In its decision, the court found criminal defamation laws incompatible with freedom of expression and stated that Section 200 “could not be justified as necessary or proportionate and failed to provide adequate safeguards to prevent arbitrary or excessive interference with free speech”. The court ruled it had a “chilling effect” on public discourse and democratic participation. For years, journalists and government critics have been arrested and faced criminal defamation charges, under a law the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA Malawi) said hindered free speech and a free press. 
 
Journalists and all Malawians can now express themselves more freely without fear of criminal sanctions. However, Malawi continues to enforce the Electronic Transaction and Cyber Security Act which has been used to charge journalists for their work. 
 
Refugee and Migrant Rights 
Malawi has longstanding reservations to the UN Refugee Convention, which recognizes the right to freedom of movement and choice of residence for refugees lawfully within a country. Malawi’s encampment policy restricts the freedom of movement of refugees and asylum seekers by requiring them to live in Dzaleka camp. This has resulted in significant lack of protection for refugees, who experience ongoing human rights violations. 
 
Malawi’s 1989 Refugee Act provides for procedures to determine refugee status but does not address the rights of refugees. Refugee rights groups have lobbied for amending the law, which requires refugees to live in the camp indefinitely, and to ensure refugees’ rights to freedom of movement, work, and education. 
 
In May, a government official was quoted in the media as saying that the government might consider reviewing the encampment policy so that refugees can live and work outside Dzaleka camp. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Dzaleka camp was originally established to accommodate up to 12,000 refugees but is now home to more than 50,000 people, mainly from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Rwanda. 
 
Due in part to overcrowding, residents of Dzaleka camp have been denied access to sufficient food, physical safety, health care, education, social security, and other vital assistance. UNHCR says Dzaleka camp has become a hotspot for human trafficking, and media outlets reported that some of the refugees have turned to sex work to survive. 
 
Right to Health 
Despite government efforts to work toward its commitments to realize universal health coverage by 2030, Malawi’s public healthcare system has insufficient trained healthcare providers, facilities, and resources, including equipment, commodities, and essential medicines. 
 
The 2024/25 national budget allocated 12 percent of public spending to healthcare. While this is a significant increase compared to previous years, it falls short of the target set by the Abuja Declaration of allocating at least 15 percent of national budgets to improve health care. In 2001, the government of Malawi committed to allocating at least 15 percent of its national budget to healthcare. 
 
Maternal mortality in Malawi is 381 deaths per 100,000 live births, placing Malawi among the 25 countries with the highest maternal mortality rates in the world. 
 
Many women and girls still experience poor quality maternal healthcare services. In Malawi, obstetric violence — abuse and mistreatment of pregnant women and girls seeking reproductive health services, including antenatal, intra-partum, and post-natal care — persists. 
 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Malawi’s penal code, under sections 153, 154, and 156, criminalizes anyone who has “carnal knowledge” of any person “against the order of nature,” attempts to commit an “unnatural offence” or undertake “indecent practices.” These vague and overly broad provisions facilitate discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people and can result in corporal punishment and sentences of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. 
 
Rights of Older People 
Malawi enacted the Older Persons Act in 2024 to safeguard older people’s rights and welfare. However, violence against older people continues. The Malawi Network of Older Persons Organizations (MANEPO) reported that between January and October, , 18 older people had been killed as a result of witchcraft accusations. While the Older Persons Act of 2024 seeks to address violence and abuse of older people alongside other rights, it is not fully compliant with Malawi’s human rights obligations under regional and international human rights standards, including on older people’s right to live a secure and dignified life. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026. New York.

Country Report: Libya

​Two rival entities continued to compete for control of Libya’s territory, resources, and international legitimacy amid deep political divisions, rising repression, and armed confrontations. 
 
Fragmentation and systemic shortcomings persisted in Libya’s judicial institutions as abusive militias operated with near impunity. The judiciary remained unwilling and unable to meaningfully investigate serious crimes. 
 
Inhumane conditions and serious abuses persisted migrant detention centers and prisons in Libya controlled by abusive, unaccountable armed groups nominally linked with authorities. 
 
Political Process 
The Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) controlled western Libya alongside affiliated security agencies and armed groups. Its rival, an armed group known as the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), controlled eastern and southern Libya alongside affiliated security apparatuses and militias, and a civilian administration known as the “Libyan Government.” The Presidential Council operates out of Tripoli, backed by armed groups, and the country’s defunct House of Representatives is eastern-based and allied with the LAAF. This division has persisted since 2014. 
 
In February, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) established an Advisory Committee to help resolve politically contentious issues around elections. Originally scheduled for December 2021, elections have been postponed indefinitely. 
 
A 12-18 month political roadmap presented to the UN Security Council in August involves establishing a viable electoral framework, a new unified government, and a dialogue on governance, economy, security, and reconciliation. 
 
A UN-led process to consolidate draft reconciliation laws covering amnesties, reparations, truth telling, and justice was still underway as of October and had not been put to a parliamentary vote. 
 
Armed Conflict 
On May 12, heavy fighting broke out between armed groups in Tripoli, after Abdelghani “Ghneiwa” al-Kikli, commander of the armed group Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) was killed. The fighting killed and injured civilians and damaged homes and civilian structures. 
 
In June, the tri-border area between Libya, Sudan, and Egypt saw heavy fighting between LAAF Subul al-Salam militia and their allies the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces, and Sudanese government forces. 
 
Unexploded ordnance- a legacy from multiple hostilities- continued to pose a serious risk to civilians, particularly in Tripoli’s outskirts. In September, unexploded ordnance in the Khallet al-Ferjan neighborhood of Tripoli injured three children. 
 
Judicial System 
Libya’s fragmented justice sector remained marred by serious due process violations and laws that breach international norms. The judiciary was unwilling and unable to meaningfully investigate serious crimes. Lawyers were unable to freely visit their clients in detention, were not informed of sessions ahead of time, and did not have unimpeded access to case documents. Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers remained at risk of attacks, intimidation, and harassment. Military courts continued to try and sentence civilians. 
 
Thirty articles in Libya’s penal code provide for the death penalty, including for speech and association. Although Libyan authorities have not carried out executions since 2010, military and civilian courts continued to impose death sentences. There were confirmed death sentences against 105 people as of December 2024, including 19 who were detained, while the rest were no longer detained or had been tried in absentia, according to the Libyan General Prosecutor. Military courts issued convictions mostly in closed trials. 
 
Penalties under the Penal Code are severe and include corporal punishments such as flogging and amputation. 
 
The Justice Ministry exercised nominal control over prisons, while armed groups and security agencies operated detention facilities across the country. Inhumane conditions including severe overcrowding, torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary detention are prevalent. 
 
Disappearances
Armed groups continue to target politicians, journalists, human rights defenders, and officials, in what the UN in August called a “pervasive and systematic practice of enforced disappearances.” 
 
In May, photos and video footage circulated on social media apparently showing House of Representatives member Ibrahim al-Drissi, chained and undressed, pleading his innocence. Al-Drissi was abducted in May 2024 in an area under the control of the LAAF, by unidentified armed groups. 
 
The Tripoli Internal Security Agency abducted activist Abdelmoneim al-Mureimi on June 30 in the coastal town of Sorman and disappeared him until his court appearance three days later. On July 4, based on statements and video footage released by the General Prosecutor’s office, he died after jumping down a stairwell at the General Prosecutor’s office the day before, where he was being interrogated on undisclosed charges. 
 
In August, a grainy image circulated on social media platforms that commentators said showed Seham Sergewa, a member of the Libyan House of Representatives who was abducted in July 2019, being physically abused. Masked armed men, apparently with links to the LAAF, stormed Sergewa’s Benghazi residence on July 17, 2019, and abducted her. 
 
Mass Graves 
Sixty-seven individuals remain missing from Tarhouna, where hundreds of residents were abducted or reported missing between 2014 and 2020 when the LAAF-aligned al-Kani militia controlled the town. The bodies of some were later found in unmarked mass graves. The Public Authority for Search and Identification of Missing Persons has identified 160 of the more than 260 bodies exhumed since June 2020. 
 
In February, authorities in eastern Libya discovered 2 mass graves with 93 unidentified bodies of migrants in the vicinity of smugglers’ warehouses in al-Kufra and Jikharra.

After clashes in Tripoli in May, authorities discovered 10 charred bodies at the SSA headquarters in the Abu Salim neighborhood and 67 more bodies in hospital refrigerators in Abu Salim and Al Khadra. They also discovered a burial site at the Tripoli Zoo, previously under the SSA’s control. 
 
International Justice 
ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan confirmed in May 2025 that his office would complete active investigations in Libya by the first quarter of 2026. The Libyan government declared on May 12 its acceptance of the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to alleged crimes in its territory from 2011 to the end of 2027. 
 
On January 19, Italian authorities arrested Osama Elmasry Njeem, a former judicial police commander, based on an ICC arrest warrant for crimes against humanity and war crimes, but released him two days later and transported him to Tripoli. ICC judges on October 17, found that Italy failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate with the court. On November 5, the Libyan General Prosecutor announced the arrest of Njeem. 
 
On July 16, German authorities at Berlin Brandenburg Airport arrested Libyan national Khaled Mohamed Ali El Hishri, known as “Al-Buti,” who worked at Mitiga prison, based on an ICC arrest warrant. German authorities surrendered him to The Hague on December 1, to face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. He becomes the first suspect to be tried at the ICC in the ongoing investigation in Libya. 
 
Eight other suspects wanted by the ICC for serious crimes, including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, are at large. 
 
Women’s Rights and Personal Rights 
Libya lacks legal provisions to prevent domestic violence, punish perpetrators, and protect survivors. The penal code allows for a reduced sentence if a man kills or injures his wife or another female relative on even mere suspicion of extramarital sexual relations. Perpetrators of rape can escape prosecution if they marry the victim. 
 
Libya’s Family Code discriminates against women with respect to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. A 2010 law requires women to get authorities’ permission before marrying a non-Libyan and denies Libyan nationality to children of Libyan mothers and foreign fathers. 
 
The penal code prohibits all sexual acts outside marriage, including consensual same-sex relations, and punishes them with flogging and up to five years in prison. 
 
Freedoms of Association and Assembly 
The penal code stipulates severe punishments, including death, for establishing “unlawful” associations and prohibits Libyans from joining or establishing international organizations without government permission. Civic groups are unable to operate independently while activists have been forced to self-censor or operate in exile. 
 
Civic groups in Libya faced severe restrictions on their ability to operate due to legal impediments and a severe crackdown by armed groups and security agencies. The Civil Society Commission, tasked with licensing civic groups, has far-reaching oversight and can search groups’ headquarters, freeze bank accounts, suspend activities, or dissolve groups without a court order. Organizations must obtain its prior approval to receive funding, conduct activities, or communicate with foreign parties. 
 
The absence of a unified legal framework compounded the situation. A 2021 draft Associations law submitted by civic groups to the House of Representatives was not passed. 
 
Freedom of Speech and Assembly 
A slew of draconian legislation in the penal code and others such as the 2014 counterterrorism law, restricts the right to freedom of speech and prevents dissent. 
 
Armed groups, militias, and security agencies cracked down on dissent, and continued to target political opponents and dissenting voices. 
 
In May, armed groups in Tripoli used live ammunition to disperse demonstrators protesting the GNU and presence of militias, after the end of armed clashes. 
 
Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Internally Displaced People 
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 894,890 migrants in Libya as of July 2025. As of November 2025, over 197,961 refugees and asylum seekers were registered with the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) in Libya. As of December 1, 2025, over 467,000 Sudanese refugees fleeing the conflict since April 2023 had arrived in Libya, but only 86,849 of them were registered. These are in addition to 20,000 Sudanese already registered prior to the current conflict. 
 
By the end of 2024, at least 32,791 people were internally displaced in Libya, including thousands of Tawergha residents driven from their homes in 2011, and thousands forcibly displaced by the LAAF from eastern Libya since 2014. 
 
As of December, at least 1,189 people were found dead or went missing in the central Mediterranean mostly after departing Libya. 
 
The European Union and its member states continued to support abusive Libyan Coast Guard forces, providing supplies, technical support, and aerial surveillance to help intercept Europe-bound migrants at sea. As of November 29, 2025, Libyan forces intercepted or rescued 25,286 migrants and asylum seekers and returned them to Libya, where they faced serious risk of torture and inhumane treatment. 
 
Inhumane conditions and serious abuses continued at migrant detention centers and prisons in Libya that are mostly controlled by abusive, unaccountable armed groups nominally linked with authorities. Abuses include long-term arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, unlawful killings, torture, overcrowding, beatings, deprivation of food and water, forced labor, and sexual assault. 
 
Collective expulsions, mass arrests, and racial discrimination by authorities continued against migrants, while unfounded rumors about migrant resettlement in Libya triggered protests. 
 
In May, the Trump administration was poised to deport an unknown number of detained migrants from the US to Libya. A US federal judge on May 7 ruled that any effort to deport migrants to Libya would “clearly” violate a prior court order barring officials from swiftly deporting migrants to countries other than their own without first weighing whether they would face persecution. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026. New York.

Country Report: Lebanon

​Despite a November 2024 ceasefire, people in Lebanon continued to suffer from the consequences of nearly 14 months of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. Near-daily Israeli strikes continued in Lebanon in 2025, resulting in over 330 people killed, according to Lebanon’s Health Ministry, including at least 127 civilians, as of October 2025, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 
 
In January and February 2025, the Israeli military withdrew from most of the southern Lebanese border villages and towns that it had occupied in late 2024, but its forces remained stationed on Lebanese territory in at least five locations. The hostilities resulted in nearly US $14 billion dollars in economic losses, according to the World Bank, including $6.8 billion worth of damage to physical structures alone. Several towns and villages were reduced to rubble, and more than 64,417 people remained displaced in Lebanon as of October 2025. 
 
Lebanon’s parliament elected a new president, Joseph Aoun, and prime minister, Nawaf Salam, in January 2025, both of whom committed to start a “new phase” in the country, promising reforms to Lebanon’s judiciary, economy, and state institutions. But as of October, the impact of reforms was limited, with much of the Lebanese population living in multidimensional poverty. Lack of accountability for human rights violations continued, including those resulting from the 2020 Beirut port explosion. Restrictions on the right to free expression, including against journalists and critics, remained in place. 
 
Accountability and Justice for Violations of the Laws of War 
By October, Lebanese authorities had yet to take meaningful steps to ensure that violations committed on Lebanese territory during the hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel could be investigated and prosecuted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). In 2024, Lebanon’s former government announced a decision to give the ICC jurisdiction since October 2023 but rescinded the decision just over a month later. 
 
In October 2025, the government announced that it had tasked the Ministry of Justice with assessing the legal measures that may be taken following Israeli attacks on journalists. This presents an opportunity to fully incorporate international crimes or laws of war violations into its domestic legal framework. Lebanon’s judicial authorities should initiate domestic investigations into unlawful attacks, and the government should accede to the ICC’s Rome Statute and submit a declaration accepting the court’s jurisdiction prior to the date of accession. 
 
In April 2025, Human Rights Watch found that two unlawful Israeli strikes on the northeastern Lebanese town of Younine, between September and November 2024, were apparent indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and should be investigated as war crimes. 
 
In August 2025, Human Rights Watch reported that Israeli forces had occupied schools in southern Lebanon during hostilities between September and November 2024 and in the following weeks, used some of them as barracks, and appear to have intentionally vandalized, pillaged, and destroyed school property, with many acts amounting to war crimes. 
 
Human Rights Watch also found that Hezbollah’s use of explosive weapons in populated areas in parts of northern Israel, killing at least 15 civilians between September and November 2024, failed to take adequate precautions to protect civilians, including to effectively warn civilians of attacks. 
 
Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon destroyed vast swathes of critical civilian infrastructure and public services, preventing tens of thousands of Lebanese from returning to their homes as of October 2025. 
 
Judicial Independence 
On July 31, 2025, Lebanon’s parliament adopted a new law on judicial independence that included positive reforms for Lebanon’s judiciary but fell short of guaranteeing judicial independence. Advances included greater judicial self-governance and the expansion of elections of judges by other judges. But it allowed Lebanon’s government-appointed top public prosecutor to order other prosecutors to cease ongoing legal proceedings and limited the ability of Lebanon’s highest judicial body to overcome government gridlock and obstruction in judicial appointments. 
 
On September 5, 2025, President Aoun requested parliament reconsider the law, highlighting what he said were “procedural, substantive, and material errors that would render parts of it inapplicable” and citing concerns that it “violates established legal foundations and international standards.” On December 18, 2025, Parliament adopted an amended version of the law, which removed the ability of the top public prosecutor to order other prosecutors to halt legal proceedings but maintained other restrictions on judicial independence. 
 
For the first time since 2017, and after years of vacancies that stalled and strained Lebanon’s judiciary, in August Lebanon’s government made new judicial appointments based on the nominations put forward by the Higher Judicial Council. 
 
Beirut Port Explosion Investigation 
In 2025, more than five years after the devastating 2020 Beirut port explosion that killed over 200 people in Beirut and injured thousands, Lebanese authorities had not yet delivered truth and justice for the victims and their families. But after two years of being stymied by Lebanese officials, the lead investigator in the Beirut port explosion case resumed the investigation. On January 16, Judge Tarek Bitar summoned 10 additional employees and security officials implicated in the blast, and held investigative sessions with other Lebanese officials in the months thereafter. 
 
The resumption of the investigation came amid pledges by newly elected President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam to uphold the rule of law and ensure justice for the port explosion victims. Justice Minister Adel Nassar had publicly committed to work to remove the obstacles that have hindered the course of the investigation. In March, Lebanon’s Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation annulled a previous decision that had barred security forces and the Prosecution office from collaborating with or receiving any communication from Judge Bitar. 
 
Some of those subsequently summoned by investigative judge Bitar in 2025, such as former Prime Minister Hassan Diab, Major General Abbas Ibrahim, and Major General Tony Saliba, complied and appeared for questioning for the first time in years. However, other officials, including two members of parliament, Ali Hassan Khalil and Ghazi Zaiter, and Ghassan Oueidat, the former prosecutor, continued to obstruct the investigation by refusing to submit to questioning. 
 
Freedom of Expression 
In 2025, Lebanese journalists, media organizations, activists, and civil society groups faced repeated use of criminal defamation charges and other vague legal provisions in response to their work alleging corruption and financial mismanagement in the country. Lebanese security agencies and prosecutors continued to summon activists, journalists, and government critics for questioning in response to their criticisms. 
 
Lebanon’s new draft Media law was submitted to the Parliamentary Administration and Justice Committee on May 27, 2025. The draft included significant advancements in protecting the right to freedom of expression, including abolishing pretrial detention and prison sentences for all peaceful speech-related violations. It also repealed criminal defamation and insult provisions from Lebanon’s penal code and military judiciary law. 
 
On August 31, members of parliament received proposed amendments to the draft law’s text, which included reintroducing pretrial detention, including “under aggravated circumstances, such as infringing on individuals’ dignity or private lives.” Lebanese and international rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, criticized the amendments and called on parliament to uphold the right to freedom of expression, including by decriminalizing defamation, blasphemy, insult, and criticism of public officials; prohibiting pretrial detention in speech-related violations; and removing onerous restrictions on the establishment of media outlets. The draft law was pending a vote in parliament, as of November 2025. 
 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
Lebanon’s population continued to suffer the economic consequences of the hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in addition to compounded effects from the country’s 2019 economic collapse. 
 
According to UNDP, the hostilities damaged more than 90,000 structures, including homes, businesses, and public infrastructure. Of these more than 23,400 structures were completely destroyed. At least 59,577 housing units were damaged in addition to 34 water facilities, affecting access to clean water for more than 400,000 people, according to UNDP. 
 
Over the past decade, poverty rates in Lebanon have tripled. The World Bank estimated in 2024 that 44 percent of the population in Lebanon was living in monetary poverty and nearly 80 percent in multi-dimensional poverty. While the government has expanded its largest social assistance program AMAN to now reach approximately 800,000 people, the program is heavily means-tested and intended for what the government defines as “the poorest” households, but in reality, because of exclusion errors and opaque scoring of the proxy means test, most people were left without access to any form of social security. 
 
In September 2025, Lebanon’s government took a critical step to implement reforms to the electricity sector by for the first time appointing members of the Electricity Regulatory Authority, the independent regulatory body mandated with overseeing the electricity sector since 2002. 
 
Refugee Rights 
After the collapse of the Assad government in Syria in December 2024 and unlawful identity-based killings and violence by government forces, nearly 100,000 Syrians fled to Lebanon according to the UN refugee agency, with most of the newly arrived asylum seekers residing in northern and northeastern Lebanon. 
 
As of September 2025, more than 238,000 Syrians in Lebanon known to UNHCR had their registration with UNHCR “inactivated” because of their verified or presumed return to Syria, including more than 6,270 people who returned as part of a UNHCR-facilitated voluntary repatriation program. While over 80 percent of Syrian refugees intend to return to Syria one day according to UNCHR, only 18 percent plan to do so in the coming year, with safety, housing, and livelihoods concerns being the principal barriers. 
 
In July, Lebanon’s government issued a plan for the return of Syrian refugees , relying on fee waivers and cash grants to incentivize returns for registered refugees. The plan, which is co-led by the Government of Lebanon and the UN, states that “all returns must be safe, dignified, and based on informed decisions of displaced Syrians.” 
 
Around 93 percent of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live in poverty, according to UNICEF, and continue to face restrictions on their right to work and own property. 
 
Women’s Rights 
Various religion-based personal status laws are discriminatory against women and allow religious courts to control matters related to marriage, divorce, and responsibility for children. Lebanon’s nationality law bars the children and foreign spouses of Lebanese women, but not men, from obtaining citizenship through their mother or spouse, impacting almost every element of their lives and leaving children at risk of statelessness. Serious gaps remain in protections against sexual harassment and domestic violence. 
 
Migrant Workers 
The legal status of thousands of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, including workers from Ethiopia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, is regulated by a restrictive and abusive regime of laws, regulations, and customary practices known as the kafala (sponsorship) system. 
 
In March 2025, Lebanese judicial authorities re-opened an investigation into allegations of slavery against a migrant domestic worker, the first case of its kind in Lebanon. Meseret Hailu, an Ethiopian migrant worker who accused her employer and recruitment agency of slavery, testified before an investigative judge for the first time in May 2025. In November 2025, the investigative judge dismissed the case, and her lawyers subsequently filed an appeal. 
 
Recruitment agencies have long been accused of subjecting workers to abuse, labor violations, and human trafficking. 
 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people continued to face systemic discrimination in Lebanon. Article 534 of the penal code punishes “any sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature” with up to one year in prison, despite a series of court rulings between 2007 and 2018 that consensual same-sex relations are not illegal. 
 
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2026. New York.