Global Terrorism Index 2025

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Islamic State and Affiliates: Islamic State Khorasan Province (Part 3)

​Evolution After Taliban’s Takeover in 2021: Regionalisation and Internationalisation
In 2021, the power dynamics in Afghanistan shifted when the Taliban regained control of the country, following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces after nearly two decades of military presence. 
 
During the US withdrawal, ISK conducted an attack on the Kabul Airport. The bombing killed at least 175 people, including 13 US service members, and left hundreds more injured. The attack is believed to have been orchestrated under the leadership of the current emir, Shahab al-Muhajir. Al-Muhajir was reported killed by Taliban in 2023, but he survived with injuries and continues to lead the group.
 
ISK rejects the Taliban's legitimacy as an Islamic group and denies its rule over Afghanistan. According to a resolution passed by the Taliban in 2022, Afghanistan operates under an Islamic system of governance, and any armed opposition to this system is deemed rebellion and corruption. Consequently, the Taliban considers ISK's actions illegal and against national interests. Therefore, assisting ISK or maintaining ties with the group in Afghanistan is prohibited. However, despite the declared hostility between ISK and the Taliban, their relationship is complex. 
 
Researchers suggest that it is influenced not only by ideological differences but also by competition for influence within the same ideological space and, ultimately, the struggle for power.
 
A few months after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, ISK expanded its influence across nearly all provinces. The group continues to use suicide bombers, ambushes, and targeted killings. These attacks often focus on civilians and religious or ethnic minorities. Human Rights Watch reported that in the year following the Taliban's takeover, ISK killed or injured 700 members of religious minorities in Afghanistan.
 
Since 2022, ISK has primarily focused its attacks in northeastern and southern Afghanistan, continuing to target key locations and infrastructure. The group remains active, engaging in violent activities as it attempts to regain influence and challenge local authorities in these regions, which border Pakistan and Tajikistan on the north. 
 
Operating on the north-eastern border area of Afghanistan, ISK targets neighbouring Pakistan. In 2018, total ISK-related deaths in Pakistan peaked, with 236 fatalities. The impact of ISK activity in Pakistan has declined since, with 75 deaths in 2023 and 15 in 2024. Total IS attributed attacks in the country in 2024 stood at 25, similar to the 24 attacks reported the previous year. 
 
In recent years, ISK has shifted its operational focus, with a decline in the number of attacks claimed or attributed to the group globally but an expansion of its geographical reach. This shift may be an attempt to highlight the Taliban’s limited control over border security and attract new recruits from the region. It could also be driven by the Taliban’s efforts to suppress ISK following the group’s takeover of Afghanistan or a broader strategic adjustment within ISK. ISK’s propaganda magazine Khorasan Ghag (Voice of Khorasan) reported in late 2023 that the decline in attacks since 2021 was part of a ‘strategic silence policy’ aimed at reducing the group’s visibility within Afghanistan.
 
Prior to 2022, ISK attacks were primarily confined to Afghanistan. However, since 2022, attacks within the country have declined, while those outside its borders have risen to a comparable level. This shift may reflect a strategic adjustment by ISK, possibly as a survival tactic in response to being increasingly suppressed in Afghanistan. Faced with diminishing territorial and operational opportunities, the group might be redirecting its activities to regions where it encounters less resistance or can more easily rebuild its networks. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2025. Institute for Economics & Peace. Sydney, Australia