Global Terrorism Index 2025

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The Sahel: Geopolitics in the Sahel

​Gold Mining: A Mechanism of Local and Global Influence (Part 2) 
A less discussed but perhaps more significant part of this story is the growing influence of China, which commands far less attention but is, according to reports, more significant in the mining sector. Chinese influence in the gold mining sector has reportedly surged since the 2021 coup and in December a Chinese owned lithium production plant opened, with the Chinese ambassador in attendance alongside the junta leader Colonel Assimi Goita, who described Chinese ties with Mali as “a strategic and sincere partnership.” The development of lithium mining in Mali is potentially significant, as lithium is a component of electric batteries and a critical mineral for the green energy transition. The more subtle and quieter influence- building approach in Mali appears to mirror Chinese strategy elsewhere on the African continent, where it has built significant influence in 27 countries.
 
Russian operations in Mali have influenced and are being influenced by its involvement in conflicts elsewhere. While the invasion of Ukraine has incentivised Russian involvement in the Sahel to procure sanction-proof revenue, it has also drawn Ukraine into the conflict. Cooperation on intelligence sharing between Tuareg rebels and Ukraine was confirmed by its intelligence chief following the deadly attack on Africa Corp troops in July. It has also been reported, though denied by Kyiv, that Ukraine has supplied drones to the rebels, in what is potentially developing as a proxy war emanating from the war in Ukraine.  
 
Events elsewhere are also likely to affect Russian operations. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has placed Russian military assets on the Syrian coast under threat. Russian bases in Syria had been the staging point for operations into Africa. While such operations could continue from Russian bases in Syria, the lack of certainty on the new Syrian government’s position remains an open question and complicates Russian operations in Africa. The partial withdrawal and uncertainty over the future of operations can be seen in Russia sending over 100 military vehicles to Mali, in January 2025, believed to have been moved from bases in Syria. The potential loss, or lessening of, influence in Syria may also push Russia to double down on its influence operations in Africa. Russia continues to build a base in Bamako around the military airbase that was attacked by JNIM in September 2024.
 
Africa Corps have maintained their presence in Libya, which could become strategically more critical to its operations if they lose their only current Mediterranean base in Tartous, Syria. In addition to military assistance, Russia has also agreed a deal with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to provide telecoms and satellites for the three Sahelian states. 
 
The overall influence in Mali remains highly competitive. While Russia's growing influence, as indicated by FBIC data, has been the most prominent, it is neither the sole nor the most dominant actor. China, France, and the United States also maintain significant influence in the country. What should not be lost in these events is the ready participation and engagement of Malian authorities. Russian partnership has become symbolic of the rejection of unpopular Western assistance missions, garnering significant popularity with sections of the population. 
 
Between 2019 and 2022, US influence in Mali also increased paradoxically while European influence declined. This was due to sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation. Despite Mali’s political instability, the US remained a key donor, with bilateral foreign assistance rising from $132 million in 2019 to over $156 million in 2020, reinforcing economic ties and dependence. Politically, the US maintained diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability following the 2020 coup, ensuring continued engagement. Although security assistance was limited after the coup, the US backed international efforts like MINUSMA prior to the mission's withdrawal. 
 
The use of private military actors, in particular, is believed by the government to be crucial to maintaining sovereignty, providing it with critical security assistance while avoiding conditions or handing over decision making or sovereignty to external actors. Though they are seeking to reclaim their sovereignty, there is a risk they will simply swap one external security dependency for another. Without improving relations with regional neighbours and other parts of the international community, it could become isolated and instead dependent on outside patronage. The Malian model is, however, clearly being followed by its two main neighbours, Burkina Faso and Niger. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2025. Institute for Economics & Peace. Sydney, Australia.