Global Terrorism Index 2025

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The Sahel: Geopolitics in the Sahel

​Gold Mining: A Mechanism of Local and Global Influence (Part 1)
Terrorism and some of the broader intercommunal violence in the region can also be linked to natural resource exploitation, specifically gold. A rich vein of gold spanning much of the Sahel was discovered in 2012 in Sudan. Two main forms of gold mining exist in the region: large scale industrial mining, generally the purview of multi-national companies; and state entities and artisanal gold mining, local level operations that are largely not regulated and are a source of revenues for local governments, militias, terror groups, criminal organisations and other non-state armed actors like private military companies.
 
Artisanal gold mining has rapidly expanded across the region in the decade since, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Gold is central to the conflict dynamics in some of these areas, which often lack significant state presence or control. The revenue raised is potentially critical to funding group activities; however, control of the territories where gold is mined and transported is perhaps more crucial, as this territorial control increases the scale of their operations and provides the financial resources, security and power projection to influence the local population. From 2018 onwards, attacks in Burkina Faso have increasingly targeted artisanal gold mines and areas around the mines. 
 
Most of the time, terrorist groups in the Central Sahel don't directly extract, trade, or smuggle gold themselves. Instead, they control the areas where artisanal gold mining happens and collect taxes from miners. These illegal economies have often existed for a long time in places with weak governance. Both state and non-state groups have benefited from, and even coordinated, these activities. 
 
Illegal activities need to be kept secret, so they depend on people within the state to protect them. In countries with weak governments, smuggling networks lead to competition among those who can offer protection and make money from these activities. This competition can cause violence as different groups fight to control the territory, and the profits. This struggle for control can then lead to instability in the state.
 
Concentrations of terrorism deaths in northern Burkina Faso correspond with the locations of gold mines as JNIM, paramilitaries like the VDP and the army of Burkina Faso fight for control over these areas. Many artisanal gold mines are informal and not included in available data. 
 
Gold is ideal for illicit smuggling, as it is difficult to trace and highly valuable. From mines in Mali and Burkina Faso, gold can be smuggled into Togo before being exported. With its value potentially in the billions, even a small amount of gold could be highly lucrative to jihadi groups. The junta in Burkina Faso announced the closure of artisanal gold sites in July 2022, partly to restrict jihadist groups’ access to funds. It is unclear what effect this may have on access to gold mining. 
 
Similar attempts in the past have been counterproductive, as jihadist groups have used closures to gain popular support from local communities that depend on the mines. It is also highly likely that most of these mines continue to operate in areas where the state no longer has control over territory. The government in Burkina Faso has control over between 50 and 60 per cent of territory in the country, meaning that much of the gold rich region in the north of the country is outside the regime’s control. 
 
Russian operations in Mali reflect a broader pattern seen in Sudan and the Central African Republic, where the acquisition of resources such as gold and diamonds, along with the acquisition of mining concessions, forms part of Russia’s approach in Africa. This strategy involves providing security, military assistance and other aid for access to valuable resources, which, in part, helps Russia circumvent sanctions imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. 
 
The full extent of such operations is difficult to uncover. Wagner troops were reported to have taken over artisanal mine sites in the past and Russia has agreed deals to build a gold refinery in Bamako. Mali’s largest international mining operations, run by Barrick Gold, ceased operations in January 2025 when the Malian government seized $245 million worth of gold, and have blocked Barrick’s access to its mines, with the government seeking to enforce recently passed laws mandating a larger share of revenues from international miners. To date, however, the full picture of Russian involvement in the mining sector in Mali and beyond is piecemeal. While Russia may strike deals for future concessions, at least publicly such deals are yet to be announced. Given the sanctions imposed over Ukraine, it is highly likely that the full extent of its operations will not be known. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2025. Institute for Economics & Peace. Sydney, Australia.