Global Terrorism Index 2025

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The Sahel: Terrorism in the Sahel
Terrorism usually occurs as a tactic within a conflict setting, used by groups with asymmetric power capabilities looking to bring about political change. The current crisis in the Sahel has been driven by several factors, including ecological degradation, poor governance, ethnic polarisation, state security abuses, pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam ideology, disputes over natural resource extraction such as gold, and the involvement of external actors such as France and Russia. 
 
The February Revolution in Libya, which led to the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011, precipitated a chain of events throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qaddafi’s violent removal, after 42 years, empowered the Malian Tuareg separatist movement. Ethnic Tuareg soldiers who had been part of the Libyan army returned to Mali. Salafi-jihadis joined them to play an important role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali, which eventually led this group to capture Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The Salafi-jihadis were ultimately defeated, and the Tuareg-Salafi Islamic Emirate of Azawad split and lasted about one year.
 
Failure by the Malian government and the international community to properly resolve the conflict in Northern Mali, by addressing its root causes, only increased tensions. It gave rise to political, social and economic problems that spread from the north, causing intercommunal violence in the Mopti and Ségou regions between Dogon and Fulani. This also exacerbated instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger increasing intercommunal violence and jihadi activity. Transnational Salafi Jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State, established local affiliates in the region by leveraging existing ethnic tensions and resource conflicts. These groups have used their ideology as a tool to mobilise support, overlaying it onto pre-existing divisions and disputes. 
 
A significant increase in deaths from conflict across the Sahel from 2011 onwards is likely driven by the onset and increasing severity of conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Burkina Faso. In 2024, conflict deaths in the Sahel exceeded 25,000 for the first time. 
 
Groups such as Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina initially focused on local issues, framing their actions through an ethnic-nationalist-religious lens. However, these groups are no longer active, having been absorbed into transnational jihadist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed when Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Macina Liberation Front merged with the al Qaeda Saharan branch, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2017. No deaths have been attributed to al-Qaeda since 2017. 
 
With its challenging terrain, distinct local practices and porous borders, local leaders in the Sahel have tremendous autonomy. They operate as political entrepreneurs, making calculated decisions as to where to operate, how and against whom. They exhibit greater willingness to negotiate or shift allegiances.The implications for the security environment are substantial, as the head of a terrorist group may not be theologically wedded to the transnational jihadi networks. This varied operating context raises the prospect of a larger shift in jihadi strategic thinking. Historically, jihadis’ commitment to ideological purity weakened their ability to build and hold a state, but this pragmatic shift raises the prospect of sustained, low-intensity conflict that may facilitate a future takeover.
 
Weak governance is at the core of the persistent inability by successive Malian governments to resolve differences amicably; and gave rise to the emergence of the Dogon, Fulani and Bambara militia. Communities were compelled to arm themselves to ensure their safety, as the government could not protect them. Similar developments occurred in Burkina Faso, between the Mossi and the Fulani, leading to several clashes. Increased intercommunal violence has led to further recruitment by jihadi groups, particularly IS and JNIM. 
 
Terrorism continues to affect the periphery regions of bordering states like Togo and Benin, countries that had been previously unaffected; although the number of terrorism deaths were relatively small when compared to neighbouring countries in the Sahel. 
 
Togo recorded ten attacks and 52 deaths in 2024, the most attacks and deaths since the inception of the Index. Attacks were largely concentrated along the country’s border with Burkina Faso, with JNIM claiming four of the attacks and likely responsible for the remaining six. 
 
This marks the further trans-nationalisation of terrorism across the Sahel. Groups like IS and JNIM are also seeking safe havens and new theatres of operations. Many of these new areas like northern periphery areas of Togo and Benin are demographically, economically and ecologically similar to regions in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and elsewhere, from which jihadi groups initially emerged over a decade ago. This trend is not uniform however, other Sahelian states such as Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia continue to experience little-to-no terrorism. 
 
Terrorist groups in the Central Sahel rely on a range of illicit economic activities to sustain their operations. Rather than directly engaging in organised crime, jihadist groups such as JNIM typically make money by imposing taxes or providing security and protection in exchange for payment. This model not only generates revenue but also helps these groups integrate into local communities, strengthening their influence. Cattle rustling has become a lucrative illicit economy for terror groups in the Sahel. The theft and trade of livestock have long been a source of conflict in the region, particularly between semi- nomadic pastoralists and farming communities. Armed groups profit by controlling cattle trade routes and imposing taxes on herders, using these interactions to deepen their governance structures. By offering protection in exchange for loyalty, terrorist organisations exploit local ethnic tensions, further entrenching their power in contested areas.
 
Drug trafficking represents one of the most financially lucrative illicit activities linked to terrorism in the Sahel. Although terrorist groups do not usually control drug production or trade directly, they provide protection to traffickers and levy taxes on smuggling operations passing through their territories. Since the 1990s, the Sahel has served as a major transit route for South American cocaine enroute to Europe. The response to drug trafficking has varied across the region, contributing to differing levels of conflict. In Niger, Tuareg rebels returning from Libya in 2011 were integrated into state-controlled smuggling networks, maintaining relative stability. In contrast, Mali’s government sought to dominate smuggling routes, leading to conflicts with Tuareg groups and contributing to prolonged instability.
 
Groups in the Sahel have generated significant revenue from kidnapping and ransom in the past two decades. Al Qaeda in the Greater Sahara, the forerunner to JNIM, financed much of its operations through kidnapping and ransoming foreign nationals in Mali and Algeria. The activity is now at the core of the economic operations of JNIM, with civilians who have some role in business or politics across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger the most common targets. Kidnapping is also used strategically, with individuals taken for political leverage and intelligence gathering.

​JNIM has been known to escalate its kidnapping activities when they seek to expand into new territory, then reduces them once control is established. For example, in 2023 the number of kidnappings increased significantly in the regions of Burkina Faso where JNIM was clashing with the pro-government militia group, Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland. In 2024 there was a 94 per cent decline in hostages in Burkina Faso falling from 144 to 8. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2025. Institute for Economics & Peace. Sydney, Australia.