Global Terrorism Index 2025

​Results
 
The Sahel: Burkina Faso
In 2024, Burkina Faso remained the country most affected by terrorism for the second year in a row. This year also marked the third consecutive year with over 1,000 fatalities from terrorism in the country. The northern and central eastern regions, near the borders with Mali and Niger, experienced over two-thirds of all attacks. Centre-Nord recorded the highest death toll, including the deadliest attack of 2024, where JNIM militants killed between 200 and 600 individuals in an assault on soldiers and civilians digging defensive trenches.
 
JNIM remained the dominant terror group, responsible for nearly half of Burkina Faso's attacks, with their activities and fatalities rising by over 50 per cent. In contrast, IS operations declined significantly, with only one attack in 2024 compared to eight in 2023, and terrorism deaths attributed to IS dropped by 91 per cent, from 175 to 15. Despite these improvements, over half of the attacks and a third of the deaths were attributed to unknown jihadist groups, likely to be JNIM or IS Sahel. 
 
Burkina Faso had substantially less direct intervention and involvement by foreign powers prior to 2023, other than the French troops who were stationed in the country since 2009. Following the second coup in September 2022, Captain Ibrahim Traore began strengthening ties with Russia around military assistance and, in January 2023, called for a withdrawal of French troops and its ambassador. In January 2024, Russian private military troops began arriving in Ouagadougou, with the peak troop presence around 300. There has been little improvement in the security situation in the country, however. In July 2024, at least 100 of the ‘Bear Brigade’ military advisors left Burkina Faso to support Russian military responses to Ukraine’s capture of the Kursk region. Given the severity of the security crisis in Burkina Faso, the impact of Russian troops remains uncertain. Reports suggest that their primary role has been to provide direct protection for junta leaders rather than actively engaging in combat missions. 
 
Beyond direct military support Russian influence models have been successful in advancing their geostrategic goals by shaping narratives supportive of the military and countering western and UN influence. Russian social media and traditional media campaigns have been active for over a decade across Africa, with attention focused in recent years on the Sahel. These efforts are extensive, with two Russian-linked influencers collectively reaching over 28 million social media followers. Their content is amplified through a vast network of hundreds of Russian-associated accounts and pages, achieving significant reach.
 
Burkina Faso has seen at least eight Russian-backed influence campaigns, matching the activity recorded in Mali and the Central African Republic, both of which host significant Russian presence. Africa Corp has been the Kremlin’s central tool for orchestrating influence efforts in Africa, linked to nearly half of all Russian operations on the continent. Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023, Russia's disinformation activities are transitioning to new entities, including the Russian Africa Corps and the Africa Initiative News Agency.
 
Russia has built its own media infrastructure with online, TV and radio channels capable of controlling and articulating its core narratives. Russian embassies have reportedly facilitated the creation of African grassroots organisations to produce and disseminate disinformation. The start and increase of Russian influence correlates significantly with the increase of negative sentiment Burkina Faso towards France. 
 
US influence also increased during this period due to sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation. Despite political instability, including the January 2022 coup d'état, the US remained a key partner, providing significant development assistance and supporting efforts to counter extremism in the Sahel region. Politically, the US maintained diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability following the coup, ensuring continued engagement.Military and other forms of assistance were frozen following the coup so it is likely that US influence may be reduced in future. 
 
The picture of influence, like that in Mali, remains complex. China has steadily increased its influence, having achieved its goal of Burkina Faso ending its cooperation with Taiwan in 2019. China has gained gold, copper and nickel exploration licenses and has also built strong relations with the new government. Whilst Chinese interests dominate along economic lines, there is a growing commitment to protect its interests against security threats. China has pledged 1 billion Yuan (US $136 million) in military assistance to train 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement members across Africa. This pledge, part of China’s Global Security Initiative includes support for an African standby force to carry out peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. Such a development is not unexpected where China seeks to protect its influence, especially in regions where non-state armed actors imperil its investments. The actual direct implications for security dynamics, especially in a country like Burkina Faso are unclear. 
 
Global Terrorism Index 2025. Institute for Economics & Peace. Sydney, Australia.