The Global Risks Report 2025: A World of Growing Divisions

Geopolitical Recession (Part 1)

State-based armed conflict (proxy wars, civil wars, coups, terrorism, etc.) was highlighted as by far the greatest risk for 2025 among the 33 risks ranked in the GRPS, with 23% of respondents anticipating a material global crisis. GRPS respondents cite Geoeconomic confrontation as well as the technology-related concerns Cyber espionage and warfare and Misinformation and disinformation among the risks most closely linked to State-based armed conflict. Concern about this risk among respondents remains alarming on a two-year horizon, with State- based armed conflict ranked #3, increasing two positions from last year’s risk ranking. 

In the EOS, Armed conflict – encompassing interstate, intrastate, proxy wars and coups – is identified as one of the top 10 global risks over the next two years. According to the EOS, this geopolitical risk ranks as the primary concern for executives in 12 countries, including Armenia, Israel, Kazakhstan and Poland, and features among the top five risks in an additional 11 economies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Executives who prioritize this risk according to the EOS frequently cite a high perception of related risks, including Biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons or hazards and Geoeconomic confrontation. 

The top ranking of State-based armed conflict may also demonstrate concern among respondents that we are in what has been termed a “geopolitical recession”– an era characterized by a high number of conflicts, in which multilateralism is facing strong headwinds. It can also be argued that such a geopolitical recession started almost a decade ago. Since 2014, the number of armed conflicts has been elevated compared to the period from the 1990s to the early 2010s. Interstate conflicts, while they tend to present the greatest threats to global stability, only constitute a small proportion of the total number of armed conflicts, which also include one-sided, non- state and intrastate armed conflicts. 

Escalation pathways 
The GRPS results are also likely to reflect the depth of respondents’ fears surrounding the two major current cross-border conflicts, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, and perhaps also concern around the risks of conflict over Taiwan, China. 

Regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the position taken by the new US administration will be critical to its evolution. Will the United States take a firmer stance towards Russia, counting on such a move acting as a deterrent to further Russian escalation, and/or will it increase pressure on Ukraine, including reducing financial support? In the latter case, European governments might increase their own support for Ukraine. The spectrum of possible outcomes over the next two years is wide, ranging from further escalation, perhaps also involving neighbouring countries, to uneasy agreement to freeze the conflict. 

In the Middle East, any shift towards a full-scale Iran-Israel war over the next two years would draw in the United States further. Such a war would, in turn, generate more long-term instability in the entire region, including the Gulf economies, where US military bases could become targets. Meanwhile, recent political developments in Syria raise both opportunities and risks. Hopes are high that there could be a revitalization of the economy and a more inclusive political environment. However, building stability across Syria will be challenging, given the many competing interests that are involved. These include both domestic groups and foreign states; if other countries decide to intervene more heavily while the transition unfolds, this could lead to renewed confrontations. 

In addition, conflict over Taiwan, China cannot be ruled out. Limited armed confrontation could be triggered more easily if global tensions are high around geoeconomic confrontation and if rhetoric is aggressive. Both the United States and China may go further in the coming years in undertaking military manoeuvres close to Taiwan, China designed to show strength and act as deterrent. A major risk is that just one such manoeuvre could be misinterpreted by the other side and/or lead to accidental loss of life or destruction of hardware, leading to tit-for-tat military escalation. 

Waning appetite for multilateralism 
With the world facing this wide spectrum of ongoing armed conflicts, and escalation risks in the two major cross-border conflicts, the current weakness of the multilateral security framework with the UN Security Council (UNSC) at its core is alarming. The UNSC has not managed to stop conflicts from escalating, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the wars in the Middle East and in Sudan. 

Despite discussions over the last year about reinvigorating UN peacekeeping operations, these are in decline on aggregate, with their size having been reduced from over 100,000 peacekeepers in 2016 to around 68,000 in 2024.

The UNSC faces ongoing structural challenges, and over the next two years risks having even less impact, given the new US administration’s likely less favourable stance towards the UN generally and its preference for seeking solutions to conflicts unilaterally. There is a danger that more governments lose faith not only in the UNSC, but in multilateralism as a forum for resolving conflicts, and that the world instead becomes more adversarial, with conflicts ending only via battlefield, winner-takes-all victories and not through negotiated, multistakeholder peace agreements. While there continue to be discussions that aim towards reform of the UNSC, they are unlikely to make meaningful progress over the next two years given the complexity of aligning national interests and the current lack of political will to do so. Furthermore, there is no viable alternative global governance set-up in sight. 

The growing vacuum in ensuring global stability at a multilateral level will lead governments around the world increasingly to take national security matters into their own hands, coordinating security and defence efforts only with select allied countries, or making unilateral military decisions. More countries will attempt to gain a greater degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency. Defence budgets could be prioritized over other long-term investments, placing at risk spending in areas such as healthcare, education and infrastructure. This accelerating military spending would represent a continuation of recent trends: World military expenditure increased for the ninth consecutive year in 2023, reaching a total of $2.4 trillion,with 2023 seeing a steep rise over 2022. The top five countries accounted for 61% of the total. As governments with strengthening militaries perceive that multilateral constraints on unilateral military action are weaker, there could be more instances of cross-border military interventions in the coming years. 

Unilateralism and the dominance of national security considerations in political agendas may also have increasingly far-reaching repercussions for state-society relations worldwide. Increased state surveillance of citizens and restrictions on individual freedoms may become more commonplace in the name of national security. Perceived or actual threats from other countries also provide an opening for governments to seize control of narratives and suppress information, perhaps blurring the lines between genuine security considerations and political expedience. Governments may take measures that diminish the transparency of public expenditure, for example when it comes to funding parties to a conflict abroad. These are all conditions that will help authoritarian regimes consolidate their power and may lead to democratic regimes taking on more authoritarian characteristics. 

​Reference: The Global Risks Report 2025 20th Edition. World Economic Forum.